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DAVIS R.

RoBINSON*

Compelling Discovery and Evidence
In International Litigation
This article discusses some of the highlights of the current international
controversy over what is commonly called extraterritoriality, with special
emphasis on the discovery of foreign located documents and on current
efforts to revise the jurisdictional sections of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States.'
I. Scope and Significance of Issues
These issues are subject today to a debate that engages the attention of the
most senior levels of our government and the governments of many friendly
countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Switzerland.
It includes such matters as application of economic sanctions to foreign
subsidiaries, re-export controls, unitary taxation, contract sanctity, application of antitrust law to foreign conduct with effects in the United States and
unilateral actions to compel the production of evidence located in a foreign
country. Over the past year, to take a representative period, the United
States has received well over two dozen formal and high level demarches on
such issues and has seen them intrude into the highest level of intergovernmental meetings. Thousands of U.S. government "person-hours"
have been spent in connection with consultations with other governments on
these issues. Since I assumed office in 1981, they have been and remain
among the most important politico-legal issues facing the Office of the Legal
Adviser.

*Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. The following article is derived from a
presentation made by Mr. Robinson on March 8, 1984 at the A.B.A. National Institute on
"Transnational Litigation: Practical Approaches to Conflicts and Accommodations."

'See principally Tentative Drafts Nos. 2, 3 & 5, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
THE UNITED STATES (Revised), Secs. 401 ff. (1982-84).
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These widely disparate subjects raise political and economic issues of
great sensitivity. Often, the United States, looking essentially to the mandates of its own legislative, executive or judicial policies, asserts jurisdiction
over persons or acts abroad. This assertion may conflict with a law or policy
to which the foreign jurisdiction attaches importance. In some cases, the
foreign jurisdiction may follow a policy of non-regulation or even encouragement of an act prohibited by the U.S. Applying a U.S. trade restriction or our antitrust law abroad may raise not only sensitive issues of
sovereignty, but also politically charged economic issues of jobs and
contracts.2 Leaders like Prime Minister Thatcher, looking at the assertion of
U.S. rights to regulate or control conduct within their own country, are
likely to be heard asking, "Wbo is in charge here?"
A.

SEEKING EVIDENCE ABROAD

Multinational activity, whether of individuals or companies, leads regulators and others to seek the production of foreign located evidence.' In those
cases, the needs of one state to have access to information that will permit a
fair and effective adjudication of rights and responsibilities often runs
directly counter to the interests of another state in preventing access to that
evidence. United States policies that support disclosure of foreign located
evidence are well established in our procedural rules and decisions. However, we must not underestimate the policies cited by other states to support
nondisclosure.
Seeking evidence from abroad is seen as a special challenge when related
to the enforcement of a law that raises policy clashes. Over the years, such
attempts, particularly in antitrust cases, have spurred a number of governments to block production of that evidence. However, attempts at foreign
discovery can create other significant kinds of conflict.
In some cases, there may be no particular policy clash with the United
States law or proceeding for which the evidence is sought, but the foreign
jurisdiction may have a bank or business secrets law prohibiting the production of that evidence itself. Or, as in the case of Switzerland, there may be a
strong policy that production of evidence from its territory may only be

2

See, e.g., Gordon, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Economic Laws: Britain

Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980).

3
Illustrative are United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F. 2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981) as amended 22
Oct. 1981, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); SEC v. Banca Della Svissera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F. 2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1983); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636

F. 2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980): Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983). See
generally, Fedders, Policing InternationalizedU.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 89 (1984).
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carried out under its own internal laws and procedures.' This may reflect, in
part, a belief that such a policy is required to protect both its sovereignty and
the rights of persons on whom discovery demands are made, or of third
parties affected by such a demand, or the general right of persons to be free
from government intrusions. There may be a strong reluctance in other
countries to permit uncontrolled enforcement of U.S.-style discovery demands that may seem more sweeping and burdensome than their own
systems allow.
B. U.S. VIEW: Restatement (Second)
To acknowledge these conflicts is not to suggest that the U.S. process
violates international law. The U.S. view, reflected in the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,' does not posit
the existence of a single authoritative jurisdiction for any particular set of
circumstances. Rather, the Restatement (Second) realistically admits the
possibility of multiple competent jurisdictions, based on different connections to the persons and circumstances in question, and attempts to resolve
such conflicts by principles of management. The most important of these
principles is the requirement in Section 40, that, in the event of conflict, each
state must consider in good faith moderating the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The Restatement (Second) suggests that a number of factors be considered
including, under recent judicial interpretations, balancing the interests of
the conflicting jurisdictions. 6
The Restatement (Second) approach resolves jurisdictional conflicts under
principles of international comity. 7 There are, of course, a number of
4
See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Bank Secrecy and Insider Trading: The Banca Della Svizzera Italiana
Case, 15 THE REV. OF SECURITIES REGULATION 942 (24 March 1982).
5
STATES (1965).
6RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec. 40 (1965). Sec.
40 provides:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person;
(c) the extend to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state;
(d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the state.
Id.
7
See Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15 GEORGETOWN J. OF
INT'L L. & POL. 17 (1983).
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problems with this approach. For example, one might wish to refine its list of
factors. Guidance about the relative importance to be assigned to each
factor would be helpful. Furthermore, it is difficult to assure that the
balancing is undertaken seriously and at the appropriate stage. Also, this
necessarily subjective process can be counterproductive if it is not carried
out with sufficient sensitivity to the interests of the foreign jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the approach of the Restatement (Second), whatever refinements it may require, has beeli accepted by U.S. courts and is the law of the
United States on these matters We believe this approach is clearly in
keeping with international law,
C.

CONTRAST PROPOSED REVISION OF RESTATEMENT

In contrast, the proposed revision of the Restatement9 attempts to reduce
the potential for conflict by abandoning the concept of balancing in the
management of clashes among what are admitted to be legitimate concurrent jurisdictions and posits instead of a winner-take-all test for determining
which single state has jurisdiction as a matter of law."0 An impulse to neaten
up the untidy conflicts among concurrent jurisdictions is understandable.
8
See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum, 595 F. 2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
9
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) Sec. 403.
Section 403 provides:
Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Although one of the bases for jurisdiction under Sec.402 is present, a state may not apply
law to the conduct, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections with
another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all the
relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or (ii) has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect on or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating
state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that
state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation in
question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states. ...
(3) An exercise of jurisdiction which is not unreasonable according to the criteria indicated in
Subsection (2) may nevertheless be unreasonable if it requires a person to take action that
would violate a regulation of another state which is not unreasonable under those criteria.
Preference between conflicting exercises of jurisdiction is determined by evaluating the
respective interests of the regulating states in light of the factors listed in Subsection (2).
"°See id., Reporter's Note 10.
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However, my office is of the firmly held view that the search for a single
authoritative jurisdiction in each situation, as a matter of law, by means of a
complex balancing process, is neither the law as it stands, nor a promising
reform. This absolutist approach is unsuited to the national institutions
which must, inevitably, make and administer our law and legal process on a
day-to-day basis. It is also unsuited to the effective operation of the international legal system as a whole. Adopting this recommended revision would
eliminate that flexibility which is essential in adapting to the ever-changing
interdependent economic system. Moreover, the judgments are necessarily
subjective, approximate and situation-specific. A nation should not be put
in jeopardy of violating international law merely because its good faith
judgments, arrived at in the light of a reasonable analysis of its own national
interests, might later turn out to be different from those reached by some
other person, tribunal or government. In other words, a climate that encourages international legal second-guessing is not conducive to effective international cooperation.

D. RETAIN Restatement (Second) Position
We believe that the current thrust of Section 40 of the Restatement
(Second) should be retained. First, the concept of concurrent jurisdiction is
well established in international law and practice. States have for generations exercised jurisdiction over persons and acts outside their own territory, based on such factors as nationality, protection of security, the punishment of universal crimes, and the effects of external acts within a State's
territory.
The proposed new Restatement approach appears to be based in part on
the incorrect view that international law generally prohibits the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign events or persons unless an exception is explicitly
recognized by international custom or agreement. Despite the tendency of
some to dismiss or misread it, the opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the S. S. Lotus" unmistakably acknowledges that the
Court's presumption in favor of jurisdiction for the territorial sovereign
does not imply a general bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by another
sovereign over foreign located persons, property or acts in appropriate
circumstances. The case recognizes that states are left a wide measure of
discretion in this regard. If there is a universally recognized prohibitive rule,
it is that a state may not exercise jurisdiction over foreign events or persons if
that state has no genuine link with those events or persons. U.S. law and
practice are clearly consistent with that core requirement, especially in those
discovery cases where there is generally no doubt about the legitimacy of the
underlying U.S. jurisdiction over the parties or cause of action for which
foreign discovery is sought.
"[1927] PCIJ, ser. A., No. 10.
Summer 1984
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II. "Conflicts of Jurisdiction" v. "Extraterritoriality"
The Office of the Legal Adviser has a strong preference for the term
"conflicts of jurisdiction" rather than the buzzword "extraterritoriality." 2
The term better describes the practicalities of management and accommodation, without the image of inflexible legal norms that fail to reflect the
interdependent world in which modern nation-states and multinational
enterprises operate. The term "conflicts of jurisdiction" also better reflects
in our view the variety and complexity of the subject matter that is involved.
That no single jurisdictional principle can be accorded automaticoverriding force in modern international intercourse becomes self-evident when
one reflects on the nature of the international community. Multinational
enterprises, by definition, operate within the territory of more than one
nation. Their ability to shift transactions, assets, documents, or technology
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction engages important regulatory or enforcement interests of many states. One state's treatment of these enterprises
may affect the legitimate interests of another. In our view, these competing
interests cannot in all circumstances be subordinated to the policies or laws
of the territorial sovereign.
Under U.S. law, when foreign located evidence is sought for a U.S.
proceeding, United States courts do not automatically defer, even where the
law or policy of the foreign jurisdiction is clearly opposed to such production. U.S. courts generally had deferred to foreign interests on a basis of
comity, until in 1958 the Supreme Court, in Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, 3 upheld a production order despite the fact that the Swiss Government had taken custody of the documents in question. However, the Court
did hold that the sanctions for non-compliance had to be limited in light of
good faith efforts to comply. The 1965 Restatement, following Societe Internationale,rejected an exception to jurisdiction where foreign illegality was a
barrier, articulating instead the balancing and comity requirement previously mentioned.' 4
The proposed revision of the Restatement continues the balancing
approach but in a different manner. Section 420 of the new draft would
expressly recognize that a U.S. court may require good faith efforts to
produce documents where prohibited by foreign law, but prohibits punishment for failure to produce if such efforts are made. 5 Presumably, however,
if the general balancing approach of the proposed new Section 403 were
2
Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, Address to the American Society of
International Law, in Dept. of State Current Policy Bulletin, No. 481 (15 April, 1983).
.3357 U.S. 197 (1958).
14RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40, supra note
6.
15Tentative Draft No. 3, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(Revised), Sec. 420 (1982).
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followed, i.e., where only one state could be found to have jurisdiction, the
Court would have to decide that, as a matter of international law, either the
U.S. did not have jurisdiction to order production or the country in which
the evidence was located did not, as a matter of law, have jurisdiction to
block production. If the implication of any U.S. order to produce a document were that the other jurisdiction did not legally have jurisdiction to
block production, each assertion or blocking action would become a zerosum game of high jurisdictional stakes.
Several recent cases in the federal courts have recognized and applied the
balancing of interests approach and have recognized the good faith defense
from Societe Internationale,albeit in varying forms and with sometimes less
than satisfactory explanations in the opinions. Among these cases are several dealing with bank secrecy statutes such as the Bank of Nova Scotia
cases. 6 In the now well known Marc Rich litigation,' 7 subpoenas connected
with allegations of massive tax fraud and energy control violations are in
conflict with the Swiss view of its sovereignty over documents located in its
territory. Marc Rich A.G. continues to be held in contempt despite continued
Swiss government assertions that the documents will not be produced in
response to unilateral U.S. process. Yet it is not clear that we have worked
out with the Swiss any applicable and adequate alternative.
All of these cases reflect the intimate interrelationship between judicial
standards for resolving jurisdictional conflicts and the needs of the diplomatic community for restraint and mutual recognition of the values of
comity in resolving international jurisdictional disputes. The Marc Rich and
Bank of Nova Scotia cases, with conflicting laws and policies, demonstrate
that our national interests in law enforcement require us to maintain a
climate in which international cooperation is possible. This is true in other
kinds of extraterritoriality cases as well. If provoked to opposition, the
territorial jurisdiction has significant advantages in a case of conflicting
requirements. But these discovery cases also allow us to draw some more
particular lessons.
First, as for foreign governments, knee-jerk reactions based solely on the
location of documents seem inappropriate. The location of the information
may be insignificant when compared with the other state's identifiable
interests-even where the situs state does not share the policy for which the
other is seeking the documents.
Second, by definition, balancing means that the interests of the U.S. and
its prosecutors will not always prevail and we must be prepared to recognize
that fact.
Third, to eliminate the need for unilateral discovery in legitimate cases,
6
See,
7

e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F. 2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
I Supra note 3.
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states have to establish alternative cooperative channels that are timely,
effective, and not intrusive on the prosecutor's case. Some mutual assistance
arrangements are already in place. With the Justice Department and other
enforcement agencies, we are examining how they might be made more
useful. We are also seeking to conclude such arrangements with additional
countries. In this process, we are increasingly aware that it may not be
feasible to insist on all the prerogatives of our system in obtaining evidence
from abroad. Some delays in disclosure are certain to be built into any
system. Hopefully, these can be minimized. It will be difficult to accommodate the fullest potential for grand jury secrecy, since some disclosure of the
nature and scope of an investigation will likely be necessary in engaging the
legal or administrative system of the foreign parties. This may require some
flexible application of Rule 6(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, if we are to manage any necessary disclosures to foreign governments.
Nevertheless, we believe that satisfactory confidential arrangements can be
drafted and when implemented can serve the interests of both the U.S. and
the foreign country involved.
Fourth, in this untidy situation, there will continue to be overlapping and
legitimate assertions of concurrent jurisdiction. The spectre of potential
conflicts will not in our view be exorcised by converting comity and balancing into a process for identifying a single legitimate jurisdiction as suggested
by the draft Restatement.
Fifth, comity implies self-restraint and accommodation of the interests of
others. There will be great strains on the international system and damage to
the interests of the United States and others unless these attitudes are
exercised by all, as a two-way street. As for other states, we urge real efforts
to accommodate our legitimate discovery needs. As for ourselves, we cannot afford to legislate, regulate, enforce, adjudicate or negotiate without
attention to the needs of the international system and its public and private
members. 18

This fifth point is perhaps the most important. It is currently one of the
principal goals to which the Office of the Legal Adviser is dedicated. We
have an active and growing diplomatic agenda concerning conflicts of jurisdiction, including discovery and mutual assistance. We hope to see progress
in managing this vital process over the coming years.

"8See generally, Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
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